Pricing Control and Regulation on Online Service Platforms

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Cachon, Gerard P.; Dizdarer, Tolga; Tsoukalas, Gerry
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Boston College; Boston University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.04078
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: decentralized pricing; revenue management; mechanism design; platforms

摘要

An open debate in platform design is who should control pricing: the platform (centralized pricing) or its service providers (decentralized pricing). We show that a key trade-off is between regulating competition and enabling price tailoring. Centralized pricing allows the platform to manage competition, but it faces information asymmetry as it cannot observe agent costs. Decentralized pricing lets agents adjust prices to their costs, but without oversight, competition can become too strong (prices too low) or too weak (prices too high). For commission-based platforms, either form of price control can prevail depending on market conditions, implying that neither dominates. However, a relatively simple tweak-adopting an affine fee structure based on posted prices or quantities served-allows the platform to decentralize pricing control without sacrificing optimality. This flexibility further supports agent classification as independent contractors, offering platforms a valuable strategic option for how to structure their workforce.