Essentiality Checks for Standard Essential Patents

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Schuett, Florian; Wipusanawan, Chayanin
• 署名单位: KU Leuven; Tilburg University; University of Passau; University of Passau
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.04292
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: standardization; R& D; patents; Licensing; LITIGATION; price caps; certification

摘要

There is widespread concern about the lack of transparency regarding standard essential patents (SEPs). This paper examines the proposal to introduce essentiality checks, a certification scheme for declared SEPs. We develop a framework that allows us to evaluate how essentiality checks would impact licensing, litigation, and incentives to innovate. In our model, an upstream innovator invests in R&D and privately learns about the likely essentiality of its patents for a standard. The innovator then licenses the patents to a downstream implementer who can contest the essentiality of the patents in court. We show that, although essentiality checks can reduce litigation, they also raise incentives for R&D investment. Because the latter can be excessive if FRAND requirements are ineffective and spillovers are small, the overall welfare impact of essentiality checks is ambiguous.