Acquihiring for Monopsony Power

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bar-Isaac, Heski; Johnson, Justin P.; Nocke, Volker
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Cornell University; University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.04604
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: acquihiring; acquisitions; Monopsony power; specialized labor markets; COMPETITION POLICY

摘要

It is often argued that startups are acquired for the sole purpose of hiring specialized talent. We show that the goal of such acquihires might be to shut down the most relevant labor market competitor. This grants the acquirer monopsony power over specialized talent. As a consequence, acquihiring may harm employees and be socially inefficient. We explore the robustness of these effects, allowing for private benefits associated with working at a startup, varying bargaining protocols, multiple employees with and without complementarities, and private information.