Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Ekmekci, Mehmet; White, Alexander; Wu, Lingxuan
• 署名单位: Boston College; Tsinghua University; Tsinghua University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.02810
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: platform competition; big tech; net fees; interoperability

摘要

Is more competition the key to mitigating dominance by large tech platforms? Could regulation of such markets be a better alternative? We study the effects of competi-tion and interoperability regulation in platform markets. To do so, we propose an approach of competition in net fees, which is well-suited to situations in which users pay additional charges, after joining, for on-platform interactions. Compared with existing approaches, the net fee model expands the tractable scope to allow variable total demand, platform asymmetry, and merger analysis. Regarding competition, we find that adding more plat-forms to the market may lead to the emergence of a dominant firm. In contrast, we find that interoperability can play a key role in reducing market dominance and lowering prices. Broadly speaking, our results favor policy interventions that assure the formidabil-ity of the competition that dominant platforms face.