Is Blockholder Diversity Detrimental?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam; Volkova, Ekaterina
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Melbourne
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.00528
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: blockholders; blocks; block diversity; financial performance; lawsuits; shareholder votes

摘要

We find that, overall, blockholder diversity, i.e., the firm shareholder base including several different types of blocks, is detrimental to firm performance. We show that lagged disclosure, on exogenous predetermined dates, that reveals an increase in block diversity is followed by a negative market reaction. Firms held by heterogeneous blockholders consistently perform worse than firms held by homogeneous blockholders. Block diversity is particularly detrimental when uncertainty is high. Disagreement among shareholders (e.g., as reflected in the frequency of lawsuits being filed) increases when the blockholder base is diverse. We make our blockholder data set public for the benefit of other researchers.