A CONTINUOUS APPROACH TO OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET EQUILIBRIUM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: FLAM, SD; BENISRAEL, A
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.38.6.1045
• 发表日期: 1990
• 页码: 1045-1051
• 关键词: GAMES GROUP THEORY; noncooperative; EQUILIBRIA IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES; programming; nonlinear; ALGORITHM FOR COMPUTING EQUILIBRIA WITH NONSMOOTH DATA

摘要

We provide an algorithm for computing Cournot-Nash equilibria in a market that involves finitely many producers. The algorithm amounts to following a certain dynamical system all the way to its steady state, which happens to be a noncooperative equilibrium. The dynamics arise quite naturally as follows. Let each producer continuously adjust the planned production, if desired, as a response to the current aggregate supply. In doing so, the producer is completely guided by myopic profit considerations. We show, under broad hypothesis, that this adjustment process is globally, asymptotically convergent to a Nash equilibrium.