A SECRETARY PROBLEM WITH UNCERTAIN EMPLOYMENT AND BEST CHOICE OF AVAILABLE CANDIDATES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: TAMAKI, M
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.39.2.274
• 发表日期: 1991
• 页码: 274-284
• 关键词: Dynamic Programming; APPLICATIONS - THE SECRETARY PROBLEM; THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM

摘要

A finite number of candidates appear one-by-one in random order with all permutations equally likely. We are able, at any time, to rank the candidates that have so far appeared according to some order of preference. Each candidate may be classified into one of two types independent of the other candidates: available or unavailable. An unavailable candidate does not accept an offer of employment. The goal is to find a strategy that maximizes the probability of employing the best among the available candidates based on both the relative ranks and the availabilities observed so far. According to when the availability of a candidate can be ascertained, two models are considered: The availability is ascertained only by giving an offer of employment (MODEL 1), while the availability is ascertained just after the arrival of the candidate (MODEL 2).