MARKET AND LOCATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM FOR 2 COMPETITORS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: LABBE, M; HAKIMI, SL
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Davis; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.39.5.749
• 发表日期: 1991
• 页码: 749-756
• 关键词: FACILITIES EQUIPMENT PLANNING - COMPETITIVE LOCATION; GAMES GROUP DECISIONS; NONCOOPERATIVE - 2-STAGE GAME; NETWORKS GRAPHS - LOCATION

摘要

We consider a two-stage location and allocation game involving two competing firms. The firms first select the location of their facility on a network. Then the firms optimally select the quantities each wishes to supply to the markets, which are located at the vertices of the network. The criterion for optimality for each firm is maximizing its profit, which is the total revenue minus the production and transportation costs. Under reasonable assumptions regarding the revenue, the production cost and the transportation cost functions, we show that there is a Nash equilibrium for the quantities offered at the markets by each firm. Furthermore, if the quantities supplied (at the equilibrium) by each firm at each market are positive, then there is also a Nash locational equilibrium, i.e., no firm finds it advantageous to change its location.