A mixed complementarity model of hydrothermal electricity competition in the western United States
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bushnell, J
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Berkeley
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.51.1.80.12800
发表日期：
2003
页码：
80-93
关键词：
摘要：
This paper presents a modeling framework for analyzing competition between multiple firms that each possess a mixture of hydroelectric and thermal generation resources. Based upon the concept of a Cournot oligopoly with a competitive fringe, the model characterizes the Cournot equilibrium conditions of a multiperiod hydrothermal scheduling problem. Using data from the western United States electricity market, this framework is implemented as a mixed linear complementarity model. The results show that some firms may find it profitable to allocate considerably more hydro production to off-peak periods then they would under perfect competition. This strategy is a marked contrast to the optimal hydroschedules that would arise if no firms were acting strategically. These results highlight the need to explicitly consider profit-maximizing behavior when examining the impact of regulatory and environmental policies on electricity market outcomes.