Auctions for procuring options
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Schummer, J; Vohra, RV
署名单位：
Northwestern University
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.51.1.41.12804
发表日期：
2003
页码：
41-51
关键词：
摘要：
We examine the mechanism-design problem for a single buyer to procure purchase options for a homogeneous good when that buyer is required to satisfy an unknown future demand. Suppliers have two-dimensional types in the form of commitment costs and production costs. The efficient schedule of options depends on the distribution of demand. To implement an efficient outcome, we introduce a class of mechanisms which are essentially, pivotal mechanisms (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) with respect to the expected costs of the suppliers. We show that the computational task of running such mechanisms is not burdensome. Our discussion uses electricity markets as an example.