A continuous model for multistore competitive location
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Dasci, A; Laporte, G
署名单位：
University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Charlotte; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.1040.0175
发表日期：
2005
页码：
263-280
关键词：
摘要：
This paper presents a simple model to determine the location strategies of two retail firms planning to open a number of stores in a geographical market. Firms try to maximize their profit under a leader-follower type competition in which the number of stores is made endogenous by the introduction of fixed costs. A novel methodology is developed in which firms' strategies are defined in terms of their location densities. This methodology leads to a model that is solvable analytically, and to several results on competitive location strategies. First, it is shown that if the follower decides to enter a market, he enters at least as strongly as the leader. Second, the leader can effectively deter entry even if she is severely cost-disadvantaged. However, in some cases the leader is better off by allowing the follower to enter the market. Third, the leader may also let the follower enter the market in some situations where she has a cost advantage. It is also shown that in situations where both firms enter the market, their location strategies are quite insensitive to model parameters.