A monopolistic and oligopolistic stochastic flow revenue management model
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Xu, Xiaowei; Hopp, Wallace J.
署名单位：
Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Newark; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Northwestern University
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.1060.0336
发表日期：
2006
页码：
1098-1109
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies a one-shot inventory replenishment problem with dynamic pricing. The customer arrival rate is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion. Homogeneous customers have an isoelastic demand function and do not behave strategically. We find a closed-form optimal pricing policy, which utilizes current demand information. Under this pricing policy the inventory trajectory is deterministic, and a retailer sells all inventory. We show that dynamic pricing coordinated with the inventory decision achieves significantly higher profits than does static pricing. Furthermore, under oligopolistic competition we establish a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the price and inventory replenishment game. We find the pricing equilibrium to be cooperative even in a noncooperative environment, but that inventory competition results in overstock and damages profits. Finally, we examine the trade-off between dynamic pricing and price precommitment and find that flexible pricing is still beneficial, provided competition is not too intense.