Congestion pricing and noncooperative games in communication networks
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ganesh, Ayalvadi; Laevens, Koenraad; Steinberg, Richard
署名单位：
Microsoft; Microsoft United Kingdom; Ghent University; University of Cambridge
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.1070.0400
发表日期：
2007
页码：
430-438
关键词：
摘要：
We consider congestion pricing as a mechanism for sharing bandwidth in communication networks, and model the interaction among the users as a game. We propose a decentralized algorithm for the users that is based on the history of the price process, where user response to congestion prices is analogous to fictitious play in game theory, and show that this results in convergence to the unique Wardrop equilibrium. We further show that the Wardrop equilibrium coincides with the welfare-maximizing capacity allocation.