Balancing terrorism and natural disasters - Defensive strategy with endogenous attacker effort
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Zhuang, Jun; Bier, Vicki M.
署名单位：
University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.1070.0434
发表日期：
2007
页码：
976-991
关键词：
摘要：
In this paper, we apply game theory to identify equilibrium strategies for both attacker and defender in a fully endogenous model of resource allocation for countering terrorism and natural disasters. The key features of our model include balancing protection from terrorism and natural disasters, and describing the attacker choice by a continuous level of effort rather than a discrete choice (i.e., attack or not). Interestingly, in a sequential game, increased defensive investment can lead an attacker to either increase his level of effort (to help compensate for the reduced probability of damage from an attack), or decrease his level of effort (because attacking has become less profitable). This can either reduce or increase the effectiveness of investments in protection from intentional attack, and can therefore affect the relative desirability of investing in protection from natural disasters.