Optimal expected rank in a two-sided secretary problem
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Eriksson, Kimmo; Sjoestrand, Jonas; Strimling, Pontus
署名单位：
Malardalen University
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.1070.0403
发表日期：
2007
页码：
921-931
关键词：
摘要：
In a two-sided version of the famous secretary problem, employers search for a secretary at the same time as secretaries search for an employer. Nobody accepts being put on hold, and nobody is willing to take part in more than N interviews. Preferences are independent, and agents seek to optimize the expected rank of the partner they obtain among the N potential partners. We find that in any subgame perfect equilibrium, the expected rank grows as the square root of N (whereas it tends to a constant in the original secretary problem). We also compute how much agents can gain by cooperation.