Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hu, Xinmin; Ralph, Daniel
署名单位：
University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Cambridge
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.1070.0431
发表日期：
2007
页码：
809-827
关键词：
摘要：
We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of restructured electricity markets, with locational marginal prices. Each player in this game faces a bilevel optimization problem that we model as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The corresponding game is an example of an equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for this class of bilevel games and give some applications. We show by examples the effect of network transmission limits, i.e., congestion, on the existence of equilibria. Then we study, for more general equilibrium programs with equilibrium constraints, the weaker pure-strategy concepts of local Nash and Nash stationary equilibria. We pose the latter as solutions of complementarity problems (CPs) and show their equivalence with the former in some cases. Finally, we present numerical examples of methods that attempt to find local Nash equilibria or Nash stationary points of randomly generated electricity market games.