A Stochastic Programming Duality Approach to Inventory Centralization Games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Chen, Xin; Zhang, Jiawei
署名单位：
University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; New York University
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.1090.0699
发表日期：
2009
页码：
840-851
关键词：
摘要：
In this paper, we present a unified approach to study a class of cooperative games arising from inventory centralization. The optimization problems corresponding to the inventory games are formulated as stochastic programs. We observe that the strong duality of stochastic linear programming not only directly leads to a series of recent results concerning the nonemptiness of the core of such games, but also suggests a way to find an element in the core. The proposed approach is also applied to inventory games with concave ordering cost. In particular, we show that the newsvendor game with concave ordering cost has a nonempty core. Finally, we prove that it is NP-hard to determine whether a given allocation is in the core of the inventory games even in a very simple setting.