Markdown Pricing with Unknown Fraction of Strategic Customers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mersereau, Adam J.; Zhang, Dan
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
• 刊物名称: M&SOM-MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1523-4614
• DOI: 10.1287/msom.1120.0376
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 355-370
• 关键词: Consumer Behavior; pricing and revenue management; Retailing

摘要

A growing segment of the revenue management and pricing literature assumes strategic customers who are forward-looking in their pursuit of utility. Recognizing that such behavior may not be directly observable by a seller, we examine the implications of seller uncertainty over strategic customer behavior in a markdown pricing setting. We assume that some proportion of customers purchase impulsively in the first period if the price is below their willingness to pay, while other customers strategically wait for lower prices in the second period. We consider a two-period selling season in which the seller knows the aggregate demand curve but not the proportion of customers behaving strategically. We show that a robust pricing policy that requires no knowledge of the extent of strategic behavior performs remarkably well. We extend our model to a setting with stochastic demand, and show that the robust pricing policy continues to perform well, particularly as capacity is loosened or the problem is scaled up. Our results underscore the need to recognize strategic behavior, but also suggest that in many cases effective performance is possible without precise knowledge of strategic behavior.