Bounded Rationality in Service Systems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Huang, Tingliang; Allon, Gad; Bassamboo, Achal
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: M&SOM-MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1523-4614
• DOI: 10.1287/msom.1120.0417
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 263-279
• 关键词: Behavioral Operations; service operations; bounded rationality; Queueing; consumer behavior

摘要

The traditional operations management and queueing literature typically assumes that customers are fully rational. In contrast, in this paper we study canonical service models with boundedly rational customers. We capture bounded rationality using a model in which customers are incapable of accurately estimating their expected waiting time. We investigate the impact of bounded rationality from both a profit-maximizing firm's perspective and a social planner's perspective. For visible queues with the optimal price, bounded rationality results in revenue and welfare loss; with a fixed price, bounded rationality can lead to strict social welfare improvement. For invisible queues, bounded rationality benefits the firm when its level is sufficiently high. Ignoring bounded rationality, when present yet small, can result in significant revenue and welfare loss.