Consignment Contracts with Revenue Sharing for a Capacitated Retailer and Multiple Manufacturers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lim, Yun Fong; Wang, Yunzeng; Wu, Yue
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; University of California System; University of California Riverside; INSEAD Business School
• 刊物名称: M&SOM-MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1523-4614
• DOI: 10.1287/msom.2015.0543
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 527-537
• 关键词: incentives and contracting; Supply chain management; capacity planning and investment; game theory; Retailing

摘要

We consider a retailer with limited storage capacity selling n independent products. Each product is produced by a distinct manufacturer, who is offered a consignment contract with revenue sharing by the retailer. The retailer first sets a common revenue share for all products, and each manufacturer then determines the retail price and production quantity for his product. Under certain conditions on price elasticities and cost fractions, we find a unique optimal revenue share for all products. Surprisingly, it is optimal for the retailer not to charge any storage fee in many situations even if she is allowed to do so. Both the retailer's and manufacturers' profits first increase and then remain constant as the capacity increases, which implies that an optimal capacity exists. We also find that the decentralized system requires no larger storage space than the centralized system at the expense of channel profit. If products are complementary, as the degree of complementarity increases, the retailer will decrease her revenue share to encourage the manufacturers to lower their prices.