Note on Cournot Competition Under Yield Uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jansen, Maria C.; Ozaltin, Osman Y.
• 署名单位: North Carolina State University
• 刊物名称: M&SOM-MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1523-4614
• DOI: 10.1287/msom.2016.0610
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 305-308
• 关键词: Cournot competition; random yield; capacity constraints; influenza vaccine market

摘要

Inspired by the U.S. influenza vaccine market, we formulate a Cournot competition model with asymmetric firms facing capacity constraints and yield uncertainty. We derive the equilibrium of this model by defining a score that ranks firms based on their capacity, unit production cost, random yield mean, and variance. In particular, we show a threshold structure. Firms that have scores above a threshold produce at full capacity, while other firms produce less than their capacities in the equilibrium. Finally, for the case of symmetric firms, we correct mistakes in the analysis of Deo and Corbett [Deo S, Corbett CJ (2009) Cournot competition under yield uncertainty: The case of the U.S. influenza vaccine market. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 11(4): 563-576], showing that society can benefit from supplier diversification under weaker conditions.