Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida
• 署名单位: Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Liverpool
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.2019.1877
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: majority judgment; Majority rule; Approval voting; Condorcet consistency; domination paradox; No-show paradox; no-show syndrome

摘要

Majority judgment (MJ) and approval voting (AV) are compared in theory and practice. Criticisms of MJ and claims that AV is superior are refuted. The two primary criticisms have been that MJ is not Condorcet consistent and that it admits the no-show paradox. That MJ is not Condorcet consistent is a good property shared with AV: the domination paradox shows that majority rule may well err in an election between two. Whereas the no-show paradox is in theory possible with MJ, it is as a practical matter impossible. For those who believe that this extremely rare phenomenon is important, it is proven that MJ with three grades cannot admit the no-show paradox. In contrast, AV suffers from serious drawbacks because voters can only tick or approve candidates-at best, only Approve or Disapprove each candidate. With AV, voters cannot express their opinions adequately; experiments show that Approve is not the opposite of Disapprove, and although AV does not admit the no-show paradox, it admits the very closely allied no-show syndrome and insensitivity. Two are too few. Substantive debate must concern three or more grades.