Co-Opetition in Service Clusters with Waiting-Area Entertainment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yuan, Xuchuan; Dai, Tinglong; Chen, Lucy Gongtao; Gavirneni, Srinagesh
• 署名单位: Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS); Johns Hopkins University; National University of Singapore; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: M&SOM-MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1523-4614
• DOI: 10.1287/msom.2019.0815
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 106-122
• 关键词: service co-opetition; waiting-area entertainment; marketing/operations interfaces; service clusters; common spaces

摘要

Problem definition: Unoccupied waiting feels longer than it actually is. Service providers operationalize this psychological principle by offering entertainment options in waiting areas. A service cluster with a common space provides firms with an opportunity to cooperate in the investment for providing entertainment options while competing on other service dimensions. Academic/practical relevance: Our paper contributes to the literature by being the first to examine co-opetition in a service setting, in addition to developing a novel model of waiting-area entertainment. It also sheds new light on the emerging practice of service clusters and small-footprint retailing. Methodology: Using a queueing theoretic approach, we develop a parsimonious model of co-opetition in a service cluster with a common space. Results: By comparing the case of co-opetition with two benchmarks (monopoly and duopoly competition), we demonstrate that a service provider that would otherwise be a local monopolist can achieve higher profitability by joining a service cluster and engaging in co-opetition. Achieving such benefits, however, requires a cost-allocation scheme that properly addresses an efficiency-fairness tradeoff-the pursuit of fairness may backfire and lead to even lower profitability than under pure competition. Managerial implications: We show that as much as co-opetition facilitates resource sharing in a service cluster, it heightens price competition. Furthermore, as the intensity of price competition increases, surprisingly, service providers may opt to charge higher service fees, albeit while providing a higher entertainment level.