Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Pang, John; Lin, Weixuan; Fu, Hu; Kleeman, Jack; Bitar, Eilyan; Wierman, Adam
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Cornell University; University of British Columbia; University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.2021.2244
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: games/group decisions; networks/graphs

摘要

In this paper, we analyze the worst-case efficiency loss of online platform designs under a networked Coumot competition model. Inspired by some of the largest platforms in operation today, we study a variety of platform designs to examine the impacts of market transparency and control on the worst-case efficiency loss of Nash equilibria in networked Coumot games. Our results show that open access designs incentivize increased production toward perfectly competitive levels and limit efficiency loss, while controlled allocation designs lead to producer-platform incentive misalignment, resulting in low participation rates and unbounded efficiency loss. We also show that discriminatory access designs balance transparency and control, achieving the best of both worlds by maintaining high participation rates while limiting efficiency loss.