Delegated Concept Testing in New Product Development

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Schlapp, Jochen; Schumacher, Gerrit
• 署名单位: Frankfurt School Finance & Management
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.2022.2318
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Project selection; search theory; incentives; resource allocation; information acquisition

摘要

Testing a large variety of different product concepts is an integral part of nearly all new product development initiatives???especially in the concept selection phase, where firms seek to identify the most promising concept for further development. Test results are usually collected by agents, who must be incentivized not only to exert effort in testing the concepts but also to report their findings truthfully. We ask: How should a firm structure its concept testing processes when testing efforts must be delegated to self-interested agents? To answer this question, we devise a principal???(multi)agent model that allows us to analyze different testing processes and to compare their relative benefits. We find that several factors determine how the firm should construct its testing processes: the efficiency of concept testing, the extent of heterogeneity in the quality of test outcomes, and the severity of information asymmetry between agents and the firm. Finally, we determine how the firm should adjust agents??? incentives to reflect its chosen testing process and which product concepts should (or should not) be tested.