Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lo, Irene; Manshadi, Vahideh; Rodilitz, Scott; Shameli, Ali
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: M&SOM-MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1523-4614
• DOI: 10.1287/msom.2020.0426
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1787-1805
• 关键词: auctions and mechanism design; nonprofit management; humanitarian operations; stochastic methods; service operations

摘要

Problem definition: Volunteer crowdsourcing platforms match volunteers with tasks that are often recurring. To ensure completion of such tasks, platforms frequently use a lever known as adoption, which amounts to a commitment by the volunteer to repeatedly perform the task. Despite reducing match uncertainty, high levels of adoption can decrease the probability of forming new matches, which in turn can suppress growth. We study how platforms should manage this trade-off. Our research is motivated by a collaboration with Food Rescue U.S. (FRUS), a volunteer -based food recovery organization active in more than 30 locations. For platforms such as FRUS, effectively using nonmonetary levers, such as adoption, is critical. Methodology/results: Motivated by the volunteer management literature and our analysis of FRUS data, we develop a model for two-sided markets that repeatedly match volunteers with tasks. We study the platform's optimal policy for setting the adoption level to maximize the total discounted number of matches. When market participants are homogeneous, we fully characterize the optimal myopic policy and show that it takes a simple extreme form: depending on volunteer characteristics and market thickness, either allow for full adoption or disallow adoption. In the long run, we show that such a policy is either optimal or achieves a constant -factor approximation. We further extend our analysis to settings with heterogeneity and find that the structure of the optimal myopic policy remains the same if volunteers are heterogeneous. However, if tasks are heterogeneous, it can be optimal to only allow adoption for the harder -to -match tasks. Managerial implications: Our work sheds light on how two-sided platforms need to carefully control the double-edged impacts that commitment levers have on growth and engagement. Setting a misguided adoption level may result in marketplace decay. At the same time, a one -size -fits -all solution may not be effective, as the optimal design crucially depends on the characteristics of the volunteer population.