Vertical information exchange in a supply chain with duopoly retailers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhang, HT
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 531-546
• 关键词: Information sharing; supply chain; COMPETITION; equilibrium; expected profit

摘要

We consider a supply chain with one manufacturer in the upstream and two competing retailers in the downstream. The retailers sell differentiated goods and are endowed with some private demand information. The paper shows that the manufacturer's optimal strategy is independent of the type of downstream competition, Cournot or Bertrand, and that no information will be shared with the manufacturer on a voluntary basis. However, complete information sharing, which benefits all three parties, can be achieved through side payment when the retailers' information is statistically less accurate or when the leakage effect is more beneficial to the retailers.