How to Win Spend and Influence Partners: Lessons in Behavioral Operations from the Outsourcing Game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Amaral, Jason; Tsay, Andy A.
• 署名单位: Santa Clara University
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2009.01036.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 621-634
• 关键词: Supply Chain Management; procurement; Negotiation; simulation; Cognitive biases

摘要

The Outsourcing Game is a role-play simulation that has been deployed in industry and academic training courses worldwide. It incorporates the concepts of hidden actions, hidden information, and misaligned incentives, and conveys messages about power, trust, and reputation. The game depicts the adventures of Acme, the brand owner of a product manufactured by an outsourced supply chain. Through a series of negotiations, Acme attempts to influence its partners (two suppliers and two service providers) by distributing its procurement spend. These partners, in turn, sway each other via side payments. To simulate the non-linear shifts in power that occur as outsourcing increases, we represent decision-making by a voting scheme with uneven vote allocations. This paper analyzes a database of game results to reveal behavioral factors that can undermine conspicuous win-win process improvements. For instance, preferences can be sensitive to the sequence in which the alternatives are encountered; decision-makers might value not only their own rewards, but also fairness in the allocation of total gains; and effectiveness of negotiation tactics will vary with community norms of acceptable behavior. Along the way we extend the political economics literature about power in block-based voting by proposing a heuristic approach for incorporating voter preferences.