Optimal Reserve Prices in Name-Your-Own-Price Auctions with Bidding and Channel Options

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cai, Gangshu (George); Chao, Xiuli; Li, Jianbin
• 署名单位: Kansas State University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University; Huazhong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2009.01045.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 653-671
• 关键词: reserve price; name-your-own-price (NYOP); single-bid; double-bid; dual-channel

摘要

Few papers have explored the optimal reserve prices in the name-your-own-price (NYOP) channel with bidding options in a multiple channel environment. In this paper, we investigate a double-bid business model in which the consumers can bid twice in the NYOP channel, and compare it with the single-bid case. We also study the impact of adding a retailer-own list-price channel on the optimal reserve prices. This paper focuses on achieving some basic understanding on the potential gain of adding a second bid option to a single-bid system and on the potential benefits of adding a list-price channel by the NYOP retailer. We show that a double-bid scenario can outperform a single-bid scenario in both single-channel and dual-channel situations. The optimal reserve price in the double-bid scenario is no less than that in the single-bid case. Furthermore, the addition of a retailer-own list-price channel could push up the reserve prices in both single-bid and double-bid scenarios.