Co-opetition and Investment for Supply-Chain Resilience

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bakshi, Nitin; Kleindorfer, Paul
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; INSEAD Business School
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2009.01031.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 583-603
• 关键词: security; Supply Chain Disruptions; RISK; bargaining

摘要

This paper considers the problem of disruption risk management in global supply chains. We consider a supply chain with two participants, who face interdependent losses resulting from supply chain disruptions such as terrorist strikes and natural hazards. The Harsanyi-Selten-Nash bargaining framework is used to model the supply chain participants' choice of risk mitigation investments. The bargaining approach allows a framing of both joint financing of mitigation activities before the fact and loss-sharing net of insurance payouts after the fact. The disagreement outcome in the bargaining game is assumed to be the result of the corresponding non-cooperative game. We describe an incentive-compatible contract that leads to First Best investment and equal gain for all players, when the solution is interior (as it almost certainly is in practice). A supplier that has superior security practices (i.e., is inherently safer) exploits its informational advantage by extracting an information rent in the usual spirit of incomplete information games. We also identify a special case of this contract, which is robust to moral hazard. The role of auditing in reinforcing investment incentives is also examined.