Governance patterns in bankruptcy reorganizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Daily, CM
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 355-375
• 关键词: bankruptcy reorganization; Boards of directors; Audit committee; institutional investors

摘要

Recent research has suggested that effective monitoring may assist firms in preventing an eventual bankruptcy filing. Audit committees, board subgroups responsible for monitoring and evaluating the financial health of the firm, may exhibit varying degrees of effectiveness in monitoring firms' decline as a function of their composition. Another monitoring body which has become increasingly important in the corporate community is institutional investors. This study investigates the extent to which audit committee composition and institutional investor holdings are related to the incidence and nature (prepackaged plans and length of time spent in reorganization) of firms' bankruptcy filings. Results demonstrate no association between affiliated director representation on audit committees or institutional holdings and the incidence of bankruptcy. These two monitoring groups are, however, associated with the nature of bankruptcy filing. Both audit committee composition and the level of institutional holdings are significantly related to a prepackaged filing and the length of time spent in reorganization during the 5-year period preceding a bankruptcy filing.