A Nonatomic-Game Approach to Dynamic Pricing under Competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yang, Jian; Xia, Yusen
• 署名单位: New Jersey Institute of Technology; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01334.x
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 88-103
• 关键词: revenue management; nonatomic games; Fixed point; competitive firms; Dynamic pricing

摘要

We study a revenue management problem involving competing firms. We assume the presence of a continuum of infinitesimal firms where no individual firm has any discernable influence over the evolution of the overall market condition. Under this nonatomic-game approach, the unanimous adoption of an equilibrium pricing policy by all firms will yield a market-condition process that in turn will elicit the said policy as one of the best individual responses. For both deterministic- and stochastic-demand cases, we show the existence of equilibrium pricing policies that exhibit well-behaving monotone trends. Our computational study reveals many useful insights, including the fact that only a reasonable number of firms are needed for our approach to produce near-rational pricing policies.