Board structure, antitakeover provisions, and stockholder wealth

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sundaramurthy, C; Mahoney, JM; Mahoney, JT
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 231-245
• 关键词: Antitakeover provisions; board leadership; SHAREHOLDER WEALTH

摘要

This paper's regression analyses from a sample of 261 firms that adopted 486 antitakeover provisions (supermajority, classified boards, fair-price, reduction in cumulative voting, anti-greenmail and poison pills) in the 1984-88 period indicate that the negative market reactions to antitakeover provisions vary depending on firms' board structures. This paper's empirical evidence indicates that while separating the positions of CEO and chairperson of the board reduces the negative effect, increased outsider representation increases negative marker reactions. (C) 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.