Supplier-Buyer Negotiation Games: Equilibrium Conditions and Supply Chain Efficiency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Martinez-de-Albeniz, Victor; Simchi-Levi, David
• 署名单位: University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01374.x
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 397-409
• 关键词: multi-period inventory management; pricing; subgame-perfect equilibrium; Strategic Inventory

摘要

In a decentralized supply chain, supplierbuyer negotiations have a dynamic aspect that requires both players to consider the impact of their decisions on future decisions made by their counterpart. The interaction generally couples strongly the price decision of the supplier and the quantity decision of the buyer. We propose a basic model for a repeated supplierbuyer interaction, during several rounds. In each round, the supplier first quotes a price, and the buyer places an order at that price. We find conditions for existence and uniqueness of a well-behaved subgame-perfect equilibrium in the dynamic game. When costs are stationary and there are no holding costs, we identify some demand distributions for which these conditions are met, examine the efficiency of the equilibrium, and show that, as the number of rounds increases, the profits of the supply chain increase towards the supply chain optimum. In contrast, when costs vary over time or holding costs are present, the benefit from multi-period interactions is reduced and after a finite number of time periods, supply chain profits stay constant even when the number of rounds increases.