Why members stay in or leave an R&D consortium: Performance and conditions of membership as determinants of continuity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Olk, P; Young, C
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine; Chapman University System; Chapman University
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199712)18:11<855::AID-SMJ923>3.0.CO;2-Q
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 855-877
• 关键词: R&D consortia; membership continuity; performance; power dependence; transaction costs

摘要

This paper jointly examines performance and conditions surrounding membership as determinants of the decision to stay or leave an R&D consortium. Hypotheses were developed for performance and, by drawing from power dependence and transaction cost theories, for conditions surrounding membership. Analysis of survey questionnaire data from 184 member organizations of U.S.-based R&D consortia indicates that performance and the conditions of knowledge-related involvement, network ties, learning, and alternatives are related to the decision to stay in or leave. These results provide limited support for power dependence but are more consistent with transaction cost theory. Subsequent analyses revealed an interaction between performance and membership conditions, suggesting performance leads to the conditions of membership, and that the continuity decision for a poorly performing consortium differs from that for one performing well. (C) 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.