Ownership structure and corporate strategy: One question viewed from two different worlds

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lane, PJ; Cannella, AA Jr; Lubatkin, MH
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Connecticut
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199911)20:11<1077::AID-SMJ68>3.3.CO;2-F
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 1077-1086
• 关键词: Agency theory; MANAGEMENT THEORY; mergers; diversification; scientific disciplines

摘要

In their response to our paper, Amihud and Lev (1999) and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1999) claim that disciplinary differences don't matter and that methods and evidence should speak far themselves, in contrast, we argue that important differences exist between financial economics and strategic management, leading to differing beliefs, norms, methods, and interpretations of empirical results. Using a strategic management perspective to review the evidence presented by Amihud and Lev in their earlier study (1981) and in their and Denis et al.'s critiques of our work (1999) we find no reason to revise our original conclusion: there is little theoretical or empirical basis for believing that monitoring by a firm's principals influences its diversification strategy and acquisition decisions. Copyright (C) 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.