Corporate tournaments and executive compensation: Evidence from the UK

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Conyon, MJ; Peck, SI; Sadler, GV
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; City St Georges, University of London; University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.169
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 805-815
• 关键词: Executive compensation; tournament theory

摘要

This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively; related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance. Copyright (C) 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.