Strategic determinants of decisions not to settle patent litigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Somaya, D
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.281
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 17-38
• 关键词: Patents; intellectual property; LITIGATION; Firm strategy

摘要

Settlement outcomes in patent litigation are modeled as resulting from strategies pursued by firms with their patented technologies. Hypotheses are derived for two types of influences: the use of patents as isolating mechanisms to protect valuable strategic stakes, and their 'defensive' role in obtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold-up. Parameter estimates from a sample selection probit model provide support for the strategic stakes hypotheses, while the evidence for mutual hold-up is inconclusive. Interindustry comparisons show that nonsettlement of patent suits in both research medicines and computers is increased by strategic stakes and, in addition, mutual hold-up appears to play an important role in computer patent suits. Copyright (C) 2003 John Wiley Sons, Ltd.