An empirical examination of transaction- and firm-level influences on the vertical boundaries of the firm

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Leiblein, MJ; Miller, DJ
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Tulane University
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.340
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 839-859
• 关键词: Vertical Integration; TRANSACTION COST THEORY; resource-based view; option theory

摘要

A large literature has successfully employed transaction cost economic theory to describe how exchange conditions affect the optimal form of organization. However, this approach has historically not accounted for the influence of firm-specific attributes on the governance decision. This paper develops a model based on insights from transaction cost economics, the resource-based view, and real options theory to examine how transaction-level characteristics, firm-specific capabilities, and product-market scope influence the governance of production. Empirical evidence derived from analysis of 469 make-or-buy decisions involving 117 semiconductor firms indicates that decisions regarding the governance of production activities are strongly influenced by both transaction- and firm-level effects. Copyright (C) 2003 John Wiley Sons, Ltd.