An Experimental Investigation of Procurement Auctions with Asymmetric Sellers
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Aloysius, John; Deck, Cary; Hao, Li; French, Ryan
署名单位：
University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Alaska System; University of Alaska Anchorage; Chapman University System; Chapman University
刊物名称：
PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
ISSN/ISSBN：
1059-1478
DOI：
10.1111/poms.12576
发表日期：
2016
页码：
1763-1777
关键词：
procurement
reverse auction
asymmetric auctions
laboratory experiment
摘要：
Electronic reverse auctions are a commonly used procurement mechanism. Research to date has focused on suppliers who are ex ante symmetric in that their costs are drawn from a common distribution. However, in many cases, a seller's range of potential costs depends on their own operations, location, or economies of scale and scope. Thus, understanding how different bidder types impact auction outcomes is key when designing an auction. This study reports the results of the first controlled laboratory experiment designed to compare prices between first-price and second-price procurement auctions for homogeneous goods when seller cost types are asymmetric and the number of bidders varies. The results indicate that first-price auctions generate lower prices regardless of market composition. The results also reveal that first-price auctions are at least weakly more efficient than second-price auctions despite the theoretical prediction that the reverse should hold in asymmetric auctions. Post hoc analysis of individual bidders' behavior in first-price auctions revealed evidence that bidders systematically underbid when their cost realizations were close to the lower bound. Furthermore, bidders adjust their behavior based on the type of the other bidders in the market in a manner inconsistent with theory. Consequently, adding a third bidder to a two-bidder market is not advantageous to the buyer unless that third bidder is a low-cost type.