Deregulation, governance structures, and efficiency: The US electric utility sector
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Delmas, M; Tokat, Y
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; The Vanguard Group, Inc.
刊物名称：
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN：
0143-2095
DOI：
10.1002/smj.456
发表日期：
2005
页码：
441-460
关键词：
摘要：
The business strategy literature offers apparently opposite views of the ability of vertical integration to cope with the uncertainty related to changing regulatory environments. In this paper, we analyze how the process of retail deregulation affects the comparative efficiency of governance structures, which range on a continuum from fully vertically integrated structures to market transactions. Based on the analysis of 177 U. S. electric utilities from 1998 to 200 1, our results show that the process of retail deregulation has a negative impact on firms' productive efficiency, as measured using Data Envelopment Analysis. Furthermore, firms that are vertically integrated into electricity generation, or that rely on the market for the supply of their electricity, are more efficient than firms that adopt hybrid structures combining vertical integration and contracting. This research has important implications because it shows the coexistence Of different types of governance structures that cope efficiently with regulatory uncertainty through different mechanisms. Copyright (c) 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.