Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: Main effects and interactions with financial performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coombs, JE; Gilley, KM
• 署名单位: University of Richmond; Oklahoma State University System; Oklahoma State University - Stillwater
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.476
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 827-840
• 关键词: CEO compensations; Stakeholders; firm performance

摘要

We test the effects of stakeholder management on CEOs' salaries, bonuses, stock options, and total compensation. We also examine the extent to which the interaction of stakeholder management and financial performance determines compensation. Using a longitudinal database of 406 Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that stakeholder management is relevant to boards of directors when setting CEO compensation. Specifically, we found a significant, negative main effect of stakeholder management on CEO salaries. Further, we found that stakeholder management opically reduces the rewards CEOs may get for increasing levels of financial performance. In tandem, these results indicate that CEOs may jeopardize their personal wealth by pursuing stakeholder-related initiatives. Copyright (c) 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.