Organizational governance and employee pay: How ownership structure affects the firm's compensation strategy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Werner, S; Tosi, HL; Gomez-Mejia, L
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Houston System; University of Houston; Bocconi University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.452
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 377-384
• 关键词: Executive compensation; employee pay; Ownership structure

摘要

This research investigated how the ownership structure is related to the firm's overall compensation strategy. The findings extend previous research that focused primarily on CEO compensation strategy. We show that there are significant differences in the compensation practices that apply to all employees as a function of the ownership structure. The results show that for owner-controlled firms and owner-managed firms there is significant pay/performance sensitivity for all employees. In management-controlled firms, changes in pay are related to changes in size of the firm. These findings lead us to conclude that ownership structure not only affects upper management's pay, but also the pay of all employees through substantial differences in the firm's compensation practices. Copyright (c) 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.