CEO incentives, innovation, and performance in technology-intensive firms: A reconciliation of outcome and behavior-based incentive schemes

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Makri, Marianna; Lane, Peter J.; Gomez-Mejia, Luis R.
• 署名单位: University of Miami; University System Of New Hampshire; University of New Hampshire; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.560
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1057-1080
• 关键词: Executive compensation; performance; INNOVATION; TECHNOLOGY; science

摘要

Building on the agency view of corporate governance, we propose that technology-intensive firms use both outcome and behavior-based performance criteria for rewarding CEOs. Using a sample of 206 firms from 12 U.S. manufacturing industries, we find that as technological intensity increases CEO bonuses are more closely linked to financial results and that total CEO incentives are associated with two indicators of desirable innovation behaviors: invention resonance and science harvesting. Invention resonance refers to the impact a firm's inventions have on other firms' inventions, while science harvesting reflects a firm's commitment to scientific research. As technological intensity increases, aligning bonus with financial results, total incentives with invention resonance, and total incentives with science harvesting predict firm market performance. Copyright (c) 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.