A Mobile Platform′s In-App Advertising Contract Under Agency Pricing for App Sales

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hao, Lin; Guo, Hong; Easley, Robert F.
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/poms.12647
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 189-202
• 关键词: mobile platform; Two-sided Market; advertising contract; agency pricing; Revenue sharing

摘要

Unlike advertising in traditional media, a mobile platform's in-app advertising market exhibits two unique features-split structure of the mobile platform with a platform owner and an app developer jointly provisioning in-app advertising, and agency pricing for app sales. We develop a two-sided market model to analyze the role of these two unique features in determining the platform owner's optimal advertising revenue-sharing contract. Our results reveal an interesting N-shaped dynamic regarding the platform owner's optimal choice of her ad revenue share with respect to the overall advertisers' valuation of in-app ads. We identify a between-agent subsidization strategy for the platform owner, where she finds it optimal to subsidize the developer via the advertising channel, leading to greater profits for both of them. We find that the advertising revenue-sharing contract under agency pricing for app sales leads to a higher app price than would be offered by the integrated platform found in traditional advertising. However, the ad price is coordinated under the platform owner's optimal choice of ad revenue share when she obtains revenue from both the advertising and app sales channels, leading to an alignment of her interest with the app developer's on ad level.