Influences of top management team incentives on firm risk taking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wright, Peter; Kroll, Mark; Krug, Jeffrey A.; Pettus, Michael
• 署名单位: University of Memphis; University of Louisiana System; Louisiana Technical University; Virginia Commonwealth University
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.548
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 81-89
• 关键词: TOP MANAGEMENT; team variable incentives; corporate risk taking; concentration of executive wealth portfolios

摘要

In our work, the influences on subsequent firm risk taking of fixed incentives relative to variable incentives as well as the separate effects on subsequent corporate risk taking of variable incentives are examined. Focusing on the top management team members, we find a higher proportion of incentives that are devoted to fixed incentives relative to variable incentives tend to be inversely associated with subsequent firm risk taking. Managerial stock options are directly and uniformly associated with subsequent corporate risk taking. Executive shareholdings, however, display a curvilinear relationship with subsequent enterprise risk taking. Copyright (c) 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.