Strategic alliance contracts:: Dimensions and determinants of contractual complexity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Reuer, Jeffrey J.; Arino, Africa
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.581
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 313-330
• 关键词: strategic alliances; organizational governance; CONTRACTS; trust; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS

摘要

In contrast to prior studies examining strategic alliances as discrete governance structures (e.g., alliances vs. M&A, equity vs. non-equity agreements), we investigate their particular contractual features. The analysis examines the dimensionality of the contractual complexity construct and investigates the determinants of firms' adoption of various contractual provisions. We find two underlying dimensions of contractual complexity, based upon the enforcement and coordination functions of different contractual provisions. The evidence reveals that firms' usage of particular contractual provisions is a function of asset specificity as well as whether the alliance's duration is pre-specified or open-ended. The findings also speak to the debate surrounding the roles of prior ties and trust for alliance governance. Firms that have collaborated with each other in the past are not less likely to negotiate enforcement provisions; rather, repeat collaborators are less likely to adopt contractual provisions that are informational in nature and are geared to the coordination of the alliance. Copyright (c) 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.