Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Larraza-Kintana, Martin; Wiseman, Robert M.; Gomez-Mejia, Luis R.; Welbourne, Theresa M.
• 署名单位: Universidad Publica de Navarra; Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; IE University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.624
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1001-1019
• 关键词: risk bearing; risk taking; Executive compensation; behavioral agency model

摘要

Employing survey and archival data from a sample of IPO firms, and extending the ideas of the Behavioral Agency Model, this study examines the influence of various forms of risk bearing created within the compensation contract on perceived risk taking. The results show that employment risk and variability in compensation each corresponds to greater risk taking, while downside risk and the intrinsic value of stock options correspond to lower risk taking. Among the implications from these results are the importance CEOs attach to relatively stable forms of pay, and to drawing distinctions between the potential for loss of pay and uncertainty about the amount of future pay. Copyright (c) 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.