CONTROL OF INTELLECTUAL ASSETS IN CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS: IMPLICATIONS FOR INNOVATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Leiponen, Aija
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.715
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1371-1394
• 关键词: knowledge; INNOVATION; Intellectual property rights; supply relationships; business services; Property rights theory

摘要

This empirical study of business-to-business service firms examines the determinants and effects of control rights to intellectual assets in a property rights theoretic framework. Regression analyses using survey data suggest that service suppliers that retain control over their intellectual output tire more innovative. In long-term relationships, service firms' clients may thus be better off balancing their need to control outsourced activities with the suppliers' incentives to invest in learning and innovation. Additionally, and aligned with property rights theoretic predictions, service suppliers' bargaining power and their indispensability in service projects are positively associated with their ability to retain control rights. In contrast, innovation capabilities are not very signficant in determining control rights allocation between service suppliers and their clients. Copyright (C) 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.