FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND ACQUISITION BEHAVIOR IN PUBLICLY-TRADED COMPANIES
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Miller, Danny; Le Breton-Miller, Isabelle; Lester, Richard H.
署名单位:
Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; University of Alberta; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
刊物名称:
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN:
0143-2095
DOI:
10.1002/smj.802
发表日期:
2010
页码:
201-223
关键词:
GOVERNANCE
acquisitions
family business
Agency theory
portfolio risk
摘要:
Much of the literature on corporate acquisitions has focused on managerial incentives for making acquisitions but has underemphasized the role played by the social context Of major shareholders. This study of Fortune 1000 firms argues that the priorities and risk preferences of family owners can have important implications not only for the volume but also,for the diversifying nature of their acquisitions. Agency and family business perspectives are used to derive expectations concerning the acquisitions behavior of family owners. Consistent with both perspectives, and owners' desire to reduce business risk, we find that family ownership is inversely related to the number and dollar volume of acquisitions. However, whereas agency theorists differ about how ownership concentration influences whether acquisitions are diversified, the family firm literature is more definitive. The latter suggests that given family owners' desire to retain control of their firms for offspring, their wealth must remain concentrated. Hence they can most easily reduce the risk of their wealth portfolio by, diversifying the business-that is, through diversifying acquisitions. Consistent with this logic, we found the propensity to make diversifying acquisitions to increase with the level of family ownership. Copyright (C) 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.